In order to reason about speci cations of computations that are given via the proof search or logic programming paradigm one needs to have at least some forms of induction and some principle for reasoning about the ways in which terms are built and the ways in which computations can progress. The literature contains many approaches to formally adding these reasoning principles with logic speci cations. We choose an approach based on the sequent calculus and design a intuitionistic logic F O IN that includes natural number induction and a notion of de nition. We have detailed elsewhere that this logic has a number of applications. In this paper we prove the cut-elimination theorem for F O IN , adapting a technique due to Tait and Martin-L of. This cut-elimination proof is technically interesting and signi cantly extends previous results of this kind.
Introduction
As one attempts to prove a given sequent by placing above it an inference rule, zero or more unproven sequent will arise for the premise of the inference rule and these sequents will, in general, involve some di erent formulas than the conclusion sequent. Such changes in sequents during the search for a proof have been used to provide a rich and exible framework for the speci cation of a wide range of computations. Of course, to make proof search resemble a computational process, the cut rule needs to be avoided; that is, when attempting to model a computation by constructing a proof, it seems sensible not to oblige the search to also search for lemmas to establish. The search for lemmas is part of the creative activity of mathematicians when they look for proofs and does not seem part of the notion of mechanical computation. The cut-elimination theorem, when available, could be used to argue that the search for cut-free proofs is a complete proof procedure. The logic programming paradigm can be de ned, at least abstractly, using this notion of proof search, although a further restriction on the search of proofs is often made. In particular, the notion of \goal-directed search" that seems to be a natural aspect of the logic programming paradigm has been formulated using the technical notion of uniform proof 18, 17] . To retain completeness of uniform proofs, restrictions on logical formulas need to maintained. For example, completeness of uniform proofs can be achieved in classical logic by restricting to Horn clauses 19]; in intuitionistic logic by restricting to hereditary Harrop formulas 18]; and in linear logic by choosing the proper logical connectives 1, 17] .
There are numerous examples of specifying computations within these logics and with using meta-theoretic properties of those logics to infer properties of computations. We only mention a few of these examples here. Intuitionistic logic has been used to specify both the dynamic and static semantics of functional programming languages 9], and theorems that relate these two semantics (such as subject reduction or type preservation) are rendered as simple consequences of the proof theory of intuitionistic logic 14] . In 17] , various linear logic encodings of simple objects with state are given and proved equivalent within linear logic. Also in that paper, a small programming language with references is speci ed, and techniques for proving the equivalence of two programs are given based on resolution within linear logic. In 2], Chirimar provide two speci cations of the operational semantics of the DLX RISC processor 20], one capturing its sequential, machine code semantics and the other capturing its concurrent, pipe-lined semantics. Using simple properties of proofs in linear logic, he is able to formally show the equivalence of those two speci cations.
Moving from the classical theory of Horn clauses (the logical foundations of Prolog) to all of linear logic (as in the Forum speci cation language 17]) greatly increases the expressive power of the logic programming paradigm. While Horn clauses are, of course, powerful enough to specify all computations, such speci cations need to represent most of the dynamics of a computation within atomic formulas, that is, within the non-logical layer of the language. As a result, deep properties of the ambient logic, such as cut-elimination, are of only limited use when reasoning about Horn clause speci cations since such properties only supply meaning for the logical constants. As more expressive logics are used, more dynamics of a computation can be captured by various aspects of the logic, and this increases the likelihood that properties of the logic can be used to derive properties of the speci ed computations.
There is a di erence, however, between specifying a computation and reasoning about a computation, and, in particular, reasoning about computation often requires induction and some way to considering all possible ways that a given computation could proceed or a given object could have been constructed. In the literature, there have been various approaches to providing for these missing features. Within type theory, for example, induction over data structures and over proofs can be used for reasoning about computations 21]. Within logic programming, there are various ways to turn the closed world assumption into a proof principle, such as SLDNF 4] . In this paper, we consider another approach that introduces new inference rules into the sequent calculus of intuitionistic logic. In particular, we add to the sequent calculus a rule for induction on natural numbers and inference rules for treating logic speci cations as de nitions instead of as theories. Our approach to de nitions follows lines developed by Schroeder-Heister 24], Eriksson 5] , Girard 8] , and St ark 26].
Our needs for reasoning about speci cations, however, forced us to develop a single extension to intuitionistic logic, called FO IN (pronounced \fold-n"), that goes beyond the logics studied in previous works. In particular, we needed one logic that allowed for not only induction and de nitions but also for higher-order quanti cation (but not predicate quanti cation) since we wished to treat higher-order abstract syntax 22]. When designing a new sequent calculus to be used for reasoning, it is important to establish a cut-elimination theorem since this one result can be used to show the consistency of the logic as well as that the consequence relation is closed under modus ponens.
The key features of FO IN (induction, de nitions, and higher-order quanti cation) interact in complicated ways, so previous cut-elimination proofs for logics with these features in isolation do not carry over to this new system. The bulk of this paper is a presentation of a proof of cutelimination for FO IN .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brie y describe some uses that have been made of FO IN . In section 3 we introduce the logic and some of its basic properties.
We proceed in Section 4 to give an overview of the cut-elimination proof. Section 5 speci es the reduction rules that will be used to eliminate applications of the cut rule. This is followed by a section which provides some auxiliary de nitions and their properties. Section 7 contains the proof of cut-elimination. We conclude with a brief comparison of our work with related work of Martin-L of and Schroeder-Heister. As we shall see, the integration of de nitions into sequent calculus makes it possible to perform a case analysis on possible ways that a speci ed computation can progress. If exploited properly, it is possible to capture notions such as simulation and bisimulation between two processes. The paper 16] shows how this can be accomplished in abstract transition systems and CCS.
A nal area where FO IN has been used to reason about speci cations is in the area of logical frameworks and higher-order abstract syntax. Logical frameworks have been successfully used to give high-level, modular, and formal speci cations of many important judgments in the area of programming languages and inference systems. These judgments, such as \the term M denotes a program", \the program M evaluates to the value V ", and \the program M has type T", are represented by predicates in the speci cation logic or by types in a dependent type calculus. One of the advantages of such formal speci cations is that they allow logical and mathematical analyses to be used to prove properties about the speci ed systems. Given the speci cation of evaluation for a functional programming language, for example, we may wish to prove that the language is deterministic or that evaluation preserves types.
One challenge in reasoning about such speci cations centers on the use of higher-order abstract syntax, an elegant and declarative encoding of abstraction and substitution 22]. With most approaches to syntactic representation, the details of variable binding and substitution must be carefully addressed throughout a speci cation, and theorems about substitution and bound variables can dominate the system analyses. With higher-order abstract syntax, on the other hand, these features are speci ed concisely and their basic properties follow immediately from the speci cation logic. However, reasoning within a logical framework about systems represented in higher-order abstract syntax has been di cult since the logics that support this notion of syntax do not provide facilities for the fundamental operations of case analysis and induction. Moreover, higher-order abstract syntax leads to types and recursive de nitions that do not give rise to monotone inductive = is used simply to indicate a de nitional clause: it is not a logical connective. A de nition is a (perhaps in nite) set of de nitional clauses. The same predicate may occur in the head of multiple clauses of a de nition: it is best to think of a de nition as a mutually recursive de nition of the predicates in the heads of the clauses.
If we keep de nitions in this general setting, the cut-elimination theorem does not hold 23]. Two di erent approaches have been taken to retain the admissibility of cut. First, if the structural rule of contraction is removed or restricted (as it is in linear logic, for example), cut-elimination can be established 8, 24] . Another approach, more appropriate for use here since we wish to work within an intuitionistic setting, is to restrict the occurrences of implications within the body of de nitions. In 24], Schroeder-Heister proved the cut-elimination theorem for intuitionistic logic in which no implication are allowed within de nitions. Here we shall allow implications in the body of de nitions if they are suitably strati ed. Toward that end we assume that each predicate symbol p in the language has associated with it a natural number lvl(p), the level of the predicate. The following de nition extends the notion of level to formulas and derivations.
De nition 1 Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is de ned as follows: The logic has inference rules for de ned atoms; the following relation will be useful for describing these rules. where the variables x are chosen to be distinct from the variables free in the lower sequent of the rule. When the CSUs and de nition are nite, this rule will have a nite number of premises.
Notice that in rst-order logics, a CSU will have at most one member, namely the MGU. Observe that several of the rules of FO IN may have variables that are free in the premise but not in the conclusion: this results from the eigenvariable y of 8R and 9L, the term t of 8L and 9R, the cut formulas B 1 ; : : :; B n of mc, the induction predicate B of natL, and the substitutions and of def L. We view the choice of such variables as arbitrary and identify all derivations that di er only in the choice of variables that are not free in end-sequent.
Although we will show that cut-elimination holds for this logic, we do not have the subformula property since the induction predicate B used in the natL rule is not necessarily a subformula of the conclusion of that inference rule. In fact, the following inference rule is derivable from the induction rule:
?! B B; ? ?! C nat I; ? ?! C :
This inference rule resembles the cut rule except that it requires a nat assumption. Although we fail to have the subformula property, the cut-elimination theorem still provides a strong basis for reasoning about proofs in FO IN . Also this formulation of the induction principle is natural and close to the one used in actual mathematical practice: that is, invariants must be, at times, clever inventions that are not simply rearrangements of subformulas. Any automation of FO IN will almost certainly need to be interactive, at least for retrieving instantiations for the invariant B.
We de ne an ordinal measure which corresponds to the height of a derivation:
De nition 4 Given a derivation with premise derivations f i g i , the measure ht( ) is the least upper bound of fht( i ) + 1g i .
Substitutions are nite maps from variables to terms. It is common to view substitutions as maps from terms to terms by applying the substitution to all free variables of a term. We can then extend the mapping in turn to formulas and multisets by applying it to every term in a formula and every formula in a multiset. The following de nition extends substitutions yet again to apply to derivations. Since we identify derivations that di er only in the choice of variables that are not free in the end-sequent, we will assume that such variables are chosen to be distinct from the variables in the domain of the substitution and from the free variables of the range of the substitution. Thus applying a substitution to a derivation will only a ect the variables free in the end-sequent.
De nition 5 If is a derivation of ? ?! C and is a substitution, then we de ne the derivation of ? ?! C as follows: Lemma 7 For any derivation and substitution , ht( ) ht( ). Proof The proof of this lemma is a simple induction on ht( ). The measures may not be equal because when the derivations end with the def L rule, some of the premise derivations of may not be needed to construct the premise derivations of .
Our logic does not contain a weakening rule; instead we allow extra assumptions in the axioms. The following de nition provides meta-level weakening on derivations. Since we identify derivations that di er only in the choice of variables that are not free in the end-sequent, we will assume that such variables are chosen to be distinct from the free variables of the weakening formulas. 4. If ends with any other rule and has premise derivations 1 ; : : :; n , then w( ; ) also ends with the same rule and has premise derivations w( ; 1 ); : : :; w( ; n ).
The following lemmas can be proved by induction on the measure of the given derivation. By the induction hypothesis, this cut on B 1 is eliminable, hence the original cut on B 1^B2 is also eliminable. In rst-order logic, when the cut formula is atomic, the cut can easily be removed by permuting the cut up toward the leaves of the proof; eventually an initial rule is reached, at which point the removal of the cut is trivial.
In FO IN , however, the rules for natural numbers and de ned concepts act on atoms, so the atomic case is not simple. Consider, for example, the derivation The obvious reduction for this is a cut between 1 and the appropriate premise of the def L rule; however, B is a formula of arbitrary complexity, and so will in general have a greater number of connectives than the atom A, which has zero. Thus a di erent induction measure is needed. Here, the cut on the atomic formula nat (s I) is replaced by two cuts, one on the atom nat I and the other on the formula B (s I). It is not clear what induction measure can be used here. For the rst cut, the atom nat I contains no logical connectives, but this is true of the original cut formula nat (s I) as well. The number of natR rules in the right subderivation of the cut has gone down by one, but the duplication of 3 might o set this. For the second cut, the cut formula B (s I) is not related at all to the original cut formula; it certainly can have no fewer connectives than the atom nat (s I). And though its left premise is shorter than the left premise of the original cut, it is unclear how the heights of the right premises compare.
Our proof uses a technique introduced by Tait 27 ] to prove normal form theorems. Martin-L of extended the method to apply beyond terms to natural deduction proofs 12], and we use it here in a sequent calculus setting. Rather than associate an induction measure with derivations, we use the derivations themselves as a measure by de ning well-founded orderings on derivations, and performing the induction relative to those orderings. The basis for the orderings is a set of reduction rules, such as those suggested above, that will be used to eliminate applications of the cut rule. We give these reduction rules in Section 5. This is followed by a section which discusses two orderings on derivations, a normalizability ordering and a reducibility ordering. The well-foundedness of the normalizability ordering for a derivation implies that the reduction rules can be used to reduce the derivation to a cut-free derivation of the same end-sequent. The reducibility ordering is a superset of the normalizability ordering; thus its well-foundedness implies the well-foundedness of the normalizability ordering. (This notion of reducibility was called convertibility by Tait and computability by Martin-L of. We prefer to avoid these terms since they carry other meanings in theoretical computer science and, instead, use reducibility after Girard 7] .) In Section 7 we prove the key lemma: for every derivation, the tree of its successive predecessors in the reducibility relation is well-founded. From this we conclude that the corresponding tree in the normalizability relation is also well-founded, and hence the cut rule can be eliminated from that derivation. Since this holds for every derivation, the consistency of FO IN follows.
Reduction Rules for Derivations
Here we de ne a reduction relation between derivations, which is an adaptation of the reduction rules used in Gentzen's original Hauptsatz 6].
De nition 13 We de ne a reduction relation between derivations. The redex is always a derivation ending with the multicut rule If n = 0, reduces to the premise derivation . For n > 0 we specify the reduction relation based on the last rule of the premise derivations. If the rightmost premise derivation ends with a left rule acting on a cut formula B i , then the last rule of i and the last rule of together determine the reduction rules that apply. We classify these rules according to the following criteria: we call the rule an essential case when i ends with a right rule; if it ends with a left rule, it is a right-commutative case; if i ends with the init rule, then we have an axiom case; a multicut case arises when it ends with the mc rule. When does not end with a left rule acting on a cut formula, then its last rule is alone su cient to determine the reduction rules that apply. If ends in a rule acting on a formula other than a cut formula, then we call this a left-commutative case. A structural case results when ends with a contraction on a cut formula. If ends with the init rule, this is also an axiom case; similarly a multicut case arises if ends in the mc rule. For simplicity of presentation, we always show i = 1. ?=init: If ends with the init rule and C is a formula in ?, then reduces to 1 ; : : :; n ; ? ?! C init : If ends with the init rule, but C is not a formula in ?, then C must be one of the cut formulas, say B 1 . In this case reduces to w( 2 : : : n ?; 1 ).
An inspection of the rules of the logic and this de nition will reveal that every derivation ending with a multicut has a reduct. Because we use a multiset as the left side of the sequent, there may be ambiguity as to whether a formula occurring on the left side of the rightmost premise to a multicut rule is in fact a cut formula, and if so, which of the left premises corresponds to it. As a result, several of the reduction rules may apply, and so a derivation may have multiple reducts.
The following lemma states that the reduction relation is preserved by weakening.
Lemma 14 If reduces to 0 , then, for any multiset of formulas, w( ; ) reduces to w( ; 0 ).
The proof of this lemma is a simple case analysis on the relevant clauses of Def. 13 and makes use of Def. 8 and Lemmas 11 and 12.
6 Normalizability and Reducibility
We now de ne two properties of derivations: normalizability and reducibility. Each of these properties implies that the derivation can be reduced to a cut-free derivation of the same end-sequent.
De nition 15 We de ne the set of normalizable derivations to be the smallest set that satis es the following conditions:
1. If a derivation ends with a multicut, then it is normalizable if for every substitution there is a normalizable reduct of . 2. If a derivation ends with any rule other than a multicut, then it is normalizable if the premise derivations are normalizable. These clauses assert that a given derivation is normalizable provided certain (perhaps in nitely many) other derivations are normalizable. If we call these other derivations the predecessors of the given derivation, then a derivation is normalizable if and only if the tree of the derivation and its successive predecessors is well-founded. In this case, the well-founded tree is call the normalization of the derivation.
Since a normalization is well-founded, it has an associated induction principle: for any property P of derivations, if for every derivation in the normalization, P holds for every predecessor of implies that P holds for , then P holds for every derivation in the normalization. Lemma 16 If there is a normalizable derivation of a sequent, then there is a cut-free derivation of the sequent.
Proof Let be a normalizable derivation of the sequent ? ?! B. We show by induction on the normalization of that there is a cut-free derivation of ? ?! B.
1. If ends with a multicut, then one of its reducts is one of its predecessors (by way of the empty substitution) and so is normalizable. But the reduct is also a derivation of ? ?! B, so by the induction hypothesis this sequent has a cut-free derivation. 2. Suppose ends with a rule other than multicut. Since we are given that is normalizable, by de nition the premise derivations are normalizable. These premise derivations are the predecessors of , so by the induction hypothesis there are cut-free derivations of the premises.
Thus there is a cut-free derivation of ? ?! B.
The next two lemmas are also proved by induction on the normalization of the given derivation. The proof of the second lemma uses Lemmas 11 and 14 for the case when the derivation ends with a multicut. Lemma 17 If is a normalizable derivation, then for any substitution , is normalizable. Lemma 18 If is a normalizable derivation, then for any multiset of formulas, w( ; ) is normalizable.
We now de ne the property of reducibility for derivations. We do this by induction on the level of the derivation: in the de nition of reducibility for derivations of level i we assume that reducibility is already de ned for all levels j < i. reducible. These clauses assert that a given derivation is reducible provided certain (perhaps in nitely many) other derivations are reducible. If we call these other derivations the predecessors of the given derivation, then a derivation is reducible only if the tree of the derivation and its successive predecessors is well-founded. In this case, the well-founded tree is call the reduction of the derivation.
In de ning reducibility for a derivation of ? ?! B C ending with R we quantify over reducible derivations of ?! B . This is legitimate since we are de ning reducibility for a derivation having level max(lvl(B) + 1; lvl(C)), so the set of reducible derivations having level lvl(B ) = lvl(B) is already de ned. For a derivation ending with L or natL, some premise derivations may have consequents with a higher level than that of the consequent of the conclusion. As a result, we cannot use the reducibility of those premise derivations to de ne the reducibility of the derivation as a whole, since the reducibility of the premise derivations may not yet be de ned. Thus we use the weaker notion of normalizability for those premise derivations. Also observe that the consequent of the premise to the rule def R cannot have a higher level than the consequent of the conclusion because of the level restriction on de nitional clauses. Finally, as with normalizations, reductions have associated induction principles.
The following lemmas are proved by induction on the reduction of the given derivation. The proof of Lemma 20 is straightforward. Proof The proof is by induction on ht( ), with subordinate inductions on n and on the reductions of 1 ; : : :; n . The proof does not rely on the order of the inductions on reductions. Thus when we need to distinguish one of the i , we shall refer to it as 1 without loss of generality.
The derivation is reducible if for every substitution some reduct of is reducible. If n = 0, then reduces to . By Lemma 21 it su ces to show that is reducible. This is proved by a case analysis of the last rule in . For each case, the result follows easily from the outer induction hypothesis and De nition 19. The R case requires that substitution for variables doesn't increase the measure of a derivation (Lemma 7). In the cases for L and natL we need the additional information that reducibility implies normalizability (Lemma 20).
For n > 0 we proceed with a case analysis of the reduction rules that apply to (and thus to ) to show that in fact every reduct of is reducible. 
Related Work
The logic FO IN is related to Schroeder-Heister's \logics with de nitional re ection" 23]. He proved cut-elimination for two logics: the rst without contraction but allowing arbitrary implications in de nitions, the second with contraction but only implication-free de nitions. He also showed a counter-example to cut-elimination for the logic with both contraction and de nitions with arbitrary implications, but conjectured that cut-elimination should hold if the de nitions were strati ed (as we accomplish in FO IN Schroeder-Heister's cut-elimination proofs do not extend to our setting. The proof of cut-elimination presented in this paper is patterned after Martin-L of's normalization proof for a natural deduction system with iterated inductive de nitions 12]. Our work can be viewed as an adaptation of his to the sequent calculus setting: our rules for de nitions and natural numbers roughly correspond to his introduction and elimination rules for inductively de ned predicates.
